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CASENOTE
Act of State Doctrine: Determining its
Viability in a Suit Involving an
Expropriation by Cuba of Foreign-Owned
Assets
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank
658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981)
In a suit brought by Banco Nacional de Cuba, a Cuban state-
owned bank, against Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase), Banco Na-
cional sought to recover an amount in excess of $9.7 million on
claims whose validity was not contested by Chase.' Chase asserted
several counterclaims based upon the expropriation of its property
by the Cuban government following the Cuban revolution.2 In its
counterclaims, Chase sought damages for the expropriation of
branch banking assets owned by Chase in its own right, and rail-
road equipment owned by Chase as trustee for certain American
investors.' The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York entered judgment in favor of Banco Nacional on
its claim, less an amount in excess of $6.9 million allowed as a
setoff on account of Chase's counterclaim for the expropriation of
its Cuban bank branches. 4 The district court dismissed the remain-
ing counterclaims.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed as modified: Adjudication of
a counterclaim against a foreign soverign plaintiff for expropriation
of the defendant's property is not barred by the act of state doc-
trine if (1) the Executive Branch has provided a "Bernstein" let-
ter 6 advising the court that it believes that the act of state doctrine
need not be applied, (2) there is no showing that an adjudication of
the counterclaim will conflict with delicate foreign relations, and
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. Id. at 877.
3. Id.
4. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
5. id.
6. See infra note 26.
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(3) the counterclaim is asserted only as a set-off and does not seek
affirmative relief.' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
In Banco Nacional de Cuba, the Second Circuit reached the
same result that the United States Supreme Court had reached
nine years earlier in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba.8 In First National, the Court held that the act of state
doctrine did not bar the judicial examination of a counterclaim
filed by a United States bank against a Cuban bank seeking dam-
ages as a result of the expropriation of property owned by the
United States bank in Cuba, where a letter from a Department of
State legal advisor suggested that the doctrine need not be ap-
plied.9 The decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank is one of the most recent pronouncements on the act of
state doctrine, a doctrine that has followed a long and circuitous
path.
This note will provide an in-depth examination of the Chase
Manhattan case, beginning with a review of the factual setting,
followed by an account of the history of the act of state doctrine,
and the interpretation given it by the Second Circuit in the Chase
decision. The note concludes with an analysis of the court's deci-
sion and its probable implications for the future.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Cuban revolution resulted in the institution of a new na-
tional government on January 1, 1959.10 The new regime regarded
itself as the lawful successor to the pre-existing government and
quickly instituted substantial changes in Cuba by building on pre-
existing laws and institutions. Through the enactment of various
statutes and decrees, the new government sought to diminish the
role of foreign enterprise in Cuba and to concentrate the means of
production in the hands of the Cuban government. Implementa-
tion of the policies of the new government resulted in the substan-
tial expropriation of foreign-owned properties, including Chase's
branch banks and the railroad equipment owned by Chase as
7. 658 F.2d at 884.
8. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
9. Id. at 762.
10. The revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Batista regime and the installation
of a new government under the leadership of Fidel Castro, Che Guevera, and others. See
generally H. MATHEWS, REVOLUTION IN CUBA (1975).
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trustee."
Banco Nacional, which had functioned as the central bank of
Cuba since 1948, was granted additional powers and played a sig-
nificant part in the reconstruction of the Cuban economy after the
revolution. Under Resolution No. 2,12 Banco Nacional was desig-
nated to take over the assets of Chase and several other banks.
Banco Nacional was subsequently placed in control of the assets
and businesses of the remaining private banks, and thereafter, be-
came wholly owned and operated by the Cuban government.
13
Chase loaned $30 million to the predecessor of Banco Nacional
in 1958, secured by United States Government bonds having a
value in excess of $30 million. 4 On September 17, 1960, the date
on which Cuba expropriated Chase's branches, the unpaid balance
of the loan was $10 million. Within days of the expropriation,
Chase sold the collateral securing the loan for more than $17 mil-
lion. Chase applied the proceeds against the outstanding loan bal-
ance and held a surplus in excess of $7.2 million. After notification
that the surplus would be retained to offset Chase's losses resulting
from the expropriation, Banco Nacional brought suit seeking the
surplus amount and various sums in excess of $2.5 million that it
had on deposit with Chase on September 17, 1980, which Chase
had also refused to repay.
Chase counterclaimed, alleging that at the time of the expro-
priation, it maintained four Cuban bank branches, valued at more
than $8.6 million. Chase averred that the branches had been ex-
propriated in violation of international law and sought full recov-
ery from Banco Nacional as the alter ego of the Cuban govern-
ment. Chase did not seek affirmative relief on its counterclaims,
which exceeded the amount claimed by Banco Nacional, but
merely requested that Banco Nacional's complaint be dismissed.'
The district court found that Banco Nacional was an alter ego
11. Chase's Cuban bank branches were expropriated under the authority of Executive
Power Resolution No. 2, issued pursuant to Cuban Law No. 851, July 6, 1960. This resolu-
tion is set out in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
12. See supra note 11.
13. Law No. 891 provided for the nationalization of nearly all of the remaining banks.
14. The loan was initially extended to Banco de Desarrallo Economico y Social, a cor-
porate agency of Cuba. The agency was subsequently dissolved by the Cuban government
and Banco Nacional succeeded to its rights and obligations, including the obligation to pay
the loan.
15. 658 F.2d at 879.
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of the Cuban government,10 that the counterclaim was justiciable,
and that Chase was entitled to a set-off on its counterclaim of an
amount in excess of $6.9 million. 7 This amount included damages
in excess of $1.4 million awarded to Chase for the going concern
value of its expropriated branches. The court dismissed Chase's
counterclaims as railroad equipment trustee on the ground that
such counterclaims were not permissible under rule 13 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.18
II. THE HISTORICAL-LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is derived from English common law
and precludes United States courts from inquiring into the validity
of public acts of a recognized foreign government within its own
territory. This preclusion extends to executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial acts.2° Chief Justice Fuller's statements in his opinion for a
unanimous Court in Underhill v. Hernandez,"1 represent the tradi-
tional American interpretation of the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves.
2 2
In two subsequent cases,25 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
adherence to the act of state doctrine as enunciated in Underhill.
The act of state doctrine has traditionally been viewed as a princi-
16. 505 F. Supp. at 428.
17. Id. at 429.
18. Id. at 435-36.
19. See generally Simmons, Sabbatino Case and the Act of State Doctrine, 14 INTr'L &
COMP. L.Q. 452 (1965).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FORMGN RELATiONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 47,
comment d (1965) [hereinafter cited as RSTATEMENT].
21. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
22. Id. at 252. See generally Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility,
6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 175 (1967).
23. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304 (1918). Although Oetjen and Ricaud reaffirmed Underhill in unambigous
terms, Justice White, in what was to become a famous dissent, asserted that these cases only
tangentially involved the act of state doctrine. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 442 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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pie of comity required by international law. " Thus, until recently,
the Court favored an absolute application of the act of state doc-
trine, even if the act involved was alleged to be violative of interna-
tional law.
The inadequacy of the act of state doctrine was suggested by
Judge Learned Hand in his decisions in the two Bernstein cases.2 '
The decision in the second case, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche (Bernstein II),26 gave rise to what became known
as the "Bernstein exception." In Bernstein II, Judge Hand, speak-
ing for the Second Circuit, declined to apply the act of state doc-
trine and allowed the plaintiff to challenge the validity of the ex-
propriation of his property by the German Nationalist-Socialist
Government because a letter from the State Department requested
that the act of state doctrine not be applied.
2 7
In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Treres Societe Anonyme (Bern-
stein I),28 a case involving the same facts, Judge Hand, while rec-
ognizing the "odious nature" of the German law,29 nevertheless up-
held the act of state defense since, unlike Bernstein II, the
Executive had given no indication of a "positive intent" to relax
the otherwise applicable act of state doctrine.8 Bernstein II thus
holds that application of the act of state doctrine is not required
when the government of the state in question no longer exists, and
when the Executive Branch suggests to the court that the doctrine
not be applied."' The Bernstein exception enabled the courts to
circumvent their previous inflexible adherence to the absolute ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine, and foreshadowed the demise
of the absolute approach to the doctrine. Further emasculation of
24. Oetjen, supra note 23 at 303-04 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 128 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
25. See infra notes 26 and 28.
26. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
27. The letter provided in part:
The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted by the United States
for the restitution to identifiable property ... is to relieve American courts from
any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the acts of Nazi officials.
Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced
Transfers, Dept. of State Press Release No. 296 (Apr. 27, 1949), in 20 DEr. OF STATE BULL.
592, 593 (1949).
28. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
29. Id. at 249.
30. Id. at 251.
31. See Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Defense or Abstention?, 66 Am. J.
INT'L L. 82, 87-91 (1972).
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the act of state doctrine took place in the subsequent case of
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.2
Sabbatino arose out of the Cuban government's expropriation
of the Cuban assets of an American commodities broker who had
contracted to purchase Cuban sugar.33 Justice Harlan, speaking for
an eight-man majority, departed from the long-standing absolute
approach to the act of state doctrine. He concluded that the doc-
trine was required neither by comity nor by international law, as
the earlier opinions seemed to imply,s4 but rather, that it is self-
imposed for policy reasons."5 By asserting the appropriateness of
judicial discretion in the decision whether to apply the act of state
doctrine, Justice Harlan cast the Bernstein exception in a com-
pletely different light. Although he declined to rule specifically on
the continued validity of the exception,"8 Harlan redefined the act
of state doctrine in terms that rendered the exception unnecessary.
In Justice Harlan's view, as issues of international law become
the subject of disagreement among countries, court decisions can
have a deleterious impact upon foreign relations. Specifically, any
examination of the validity of another nation's expropriation of the
property of a foreigner would require adjudication of sensitive is-
sues relating to "the practical and idealogical goals of the various
members of the community of nations."37 Concluding that it could
easily risk interference with the Executive Branch's conduct of for-
eign policy by rendering judgment on questions arising in so uncer-
tain an area, the Court held that the act of state doctrine fore-
closed inquiry into the Cuban expropriation even if the
32. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
33. The facts of this case may be briefly summarized. Farr, Whitlock & Co., an Ameri-
can commodities broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar from a Cuban corporation
whose corporate stock was owned primarily by United States residents. Before the shipment
could leave Cuba, all of the corporate assets were expropriated. The cargo was not allowed
to leave until Farr, Whitlock had entered into new contracts with Banco Nacional. Farr,
Whitlock somehow obtained possession of the bills of lading without making payment to
Banco Nacional and sold them to its own customer. Banco Nacional brought suit, alleging
conversion of the bills of lading. The suit was brought against Sabbatino, who had been
appointed as Temporary Receiver of the New York assets of the Cuban corporation affected
by the expropriation decree. 376 U.S. at 427-37.
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id. at 437.
36. The Court saw no need to consider the Second Circuit's holding in Bernstein since
the State Department, in a brief amicus curiae, had urged that the act of state doctrine be
applied. 376 U.S. at 420.
37. Id. at 430.
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expropriation was violative of international law. 8
Sabbatino encourages flexible balancing of interests in light of
current developments in international law. If international law has
not developed to the point of firm agreement between the parties,
the court ought to apply the act of state doctrine rather than pre-
empt the State Department in its conduct of foreign policy.
Despite its injection of flexibility and discretion into the deci-
sion whether to apply the newly circumscribed act of state doc-
trine, Sabbatino permits no reading other than an intent to fore-
close adjudication in United States courts of all cases involving
expropriations not governed by treaties. 39 Sabbatino, nevertheless,
represents a further refinement of the act of state doctrine since it
challenges the judiciary to consider in each case whether interna-
tional law is sufficiently well-developed to justify departure from
the doctrine.
Justice White, the sole dissenter in Sabbatino, railed against
inflexible operation of the act of state doctrine, but seemed con-
vinced that the international law of expropriation was well-devel-
oped. Traditionally, international law imposes three conditions
which must be met in any expropriation: it must serve some public
purpose, there must be nondiscrimination in the taking, and com-
pensation must be fair and prompt.4 0 Justice White relied upon
this traditional view. Justice Harlan, however, relegated these re-
quirements to the status of customary international law, which, in
his view, was insufficient to preclude application of the doctrine.'
While the proceedings for the entry of judgment on remand
were still pending in Sabbatino, Congress enacted the Hick-
enlooper Amendment.42 This amendment, in effect, reversed the
Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino by providing that no
United States court should refrain from determining under inter-
national law whether a foreign act of expropriation is proper unless
the President suggests otherwise. Following enactment of the
Hickenlooper Amendment, the district court entered judgment for
Banco Nacional, holding that the amendment had removed the bar
interposed on Cuban expropriations by the act of state doctrine."
38. Id. at 428.
39. Id.
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 185.
41. 376 U.S. at 428.
42. 22 U.S.C. § 2270(e)(2) (1976).
43. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Fam, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aft'd, 383 F.2d
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The decision of the United States Supreme Court in First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba4 - represents an incur-
sion upon the Court's previous ruling in Sabbatino. First National
involved a claim by Banco Nacional and a counterclaim by First
National in a factual setting similar to that in Chase.41 After hear-
ing the case a second time,"' the Supreme Court, in a complex de-
cision, allowed First National's counterclaim. 7 Although five mem-
bers of the Court voted to reverse, only the opinion of Justice
Rehnquist, joined by two other Justices, explicitly adopted the
Bernstein exception. Rehnquist stated that the act of state doc-
trine does not apply when the "Executive Branch expressly repre-
sents to the Court that the doctrine would not advance the inter-
ests of American foreign policy."4" Rehnquist was thus able to
distinguish the Court's position from that in Sabbatino because of
the presence in First National of the statement of State Depart-
ment policy to the effect that the act of state doctrine should not
be applied in "this or like cases. '49 Justice Rehnquist relied upon
the assertion that "the Supreme Court has recognized the exten-
sive competence of the Executive in the field of foreign affairs
quite as emphatically as it has recognized the act of state
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
44. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
45. First National had loaned $15 million to a predecessor of Banco Nacional on July 2,
1958. United States government bonds were pledged as collateral. With only $5 million of
the loan repaid (and the same amount of collateral retained), the Cuban government expro-
priated First National's branch offices in Cuba on September 16, 1960. A week later, First
National sold the remaining collateral for approximately $1.8 million. Banco Nacional then
brought suit to recover the excess, after which, First National counterclaimed. Id. at 760-61.
46. The district court granted summary judgment to First National, holding that Sab-
batino had been legislatively overruled by the Hickenlooper Amendment. First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 220 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the Hickenlooper Amendment did not govern the dispute,
but rather, that Congress intended the amendment to apply to expropriated property subse-
quently marketed in the United States. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank,
431 F.2d 394, 399-402 (2d Cir. 1970). While a petition for certiorari was pending, the State
Department advised the Supreme Court that the act of state defense should not be applied.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the court of appeals for
consideration of the State Department's views. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). The court of appeals adhered to its original judgment in a split
decision. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971). The
Supreme Court again granted certiorari. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
404 U.S. 820 (1971).
47. 406 U.S. at 762.
48. Id. at 768.
49. The position of the State Department in First National was in marked contrast to
its position in Sabbatino. In First National, the Solicitor General expressed a clear desire
that the case be heard. See infra note 54.
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doctrine.""0
To avoid relegating the Judiciary to the whims of the State
Department, Justice Rehnquist further distinguished First Na-
tional from Sabbatino on the basis of a questionable analogy be-
tween the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity, stating
that both "are judicially created to effectuate general notions of
comity among nations and among the respective branches of the
government." 1 Relying upon National City Bank v. Republic of
China,52 Justice Rehnquist felt that First National could assert its
counterclaim without regard to either sovereign immunity or the
act of state doctrine.
Justice Douglas, expressing the same concern in his concur-
rence, concluded that a foreign sovereign voluntarily entering
United States courts in order to avail itself of United States laws
should not be able to invoke the act of state doctrine as a defense
against counterclaims asserted against it. He found that the same
considerations of "fair dealing" in Republic of China" were pre-
sent in First National, and required "recognition of any counter-
claim or setoff that eliminate[d] or reduce[d] that claim. '54 Justice
Douglas asserted that such "fair dealing" dictates that the act of
state doctrine be set aside when the counterclaim or set-off does
not exceed the claim asserted by the sovereign.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, felt that Republic of
China was not dispositive because the Court in that case dealt
with the question of jurisdiction over the parties to hear a counter-
claim "asserted against a sovereign state voluntarily entering our
courts," and not, as in First National, with the "justiciability" or
"appropriateness of the subject matter for judicial resolution." 5'
Powell felt that the Court in Sabbatino went too far; he stated that
he would have joined the dissent had he been a member of that
Court. Justice Powell would apply the act of state doctrine only
upon a showing by the Executive or upon the court's own finding
that a failure to apply the doctrine would interfere with "delicate
50. 406 U.S. at 767.
51. Id. at 762.
52. 348 U.S. 356 (1965).
53. Republic of China sharply curtailed the absolute approach to sovereign immunity
by holding that a defendant, sued in a United States court by a foreign sovereign, may
assert a counterclaim or setoff unrelated to the subject matter of the original suit. Id. at 364.
54. 406 U.S. at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring).
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foreign relations conducted by the political branches. ' ..
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by three other Justices,
accepted the Court's reasoning in Sabbatino. He rejected the view
held by the majority that the act of state bar should be removed in
cases where the Executive Department would not be subjected to
embarassment. Characterizing that view as "mechanical and falla-
cious," Brennan stated that it necessitated an abdication of judi-
cial responsibility.5 7 Emphasizing the fact that the act of state doc-
trine is based upon "the proper distribution of functions between
the judicial and political branches of the government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs," 58 Brennan concluded that any deter-
mination of the legality of the act of a foreign sovereign within its
boundaries would amount to a "political question," requiring judi-
cial abstention when that act involved an area of customary law
upon which there is a lack of consensus, as in the case of
expropriation."
Justice Brennan's argument appears to be valid, since, not-
withstanding the consensus among nations that there exists a duty
to compensate aliens upon the expropriation of their property,
there is no consensus on either the rationale for such a duty or the
appropriate standard of compensation. There appear to be at least
three distinct positions on the degree of compensation thought
necessary to compensate an alien for the expropriation of his
property."
The first of these positions is the traditional view, espoused by
the United States and most Western nations. According to this
view, there is an objective international law standard which man-
dates that the compensation be prompt, adequate, and effective."
The second view, supported by the Latin American nations, denies
compensation to foreigners to the same extent that nationals of the
expropriating state are denied such compensation. 2 Those sub-
56. Id. at 775.
57. Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 785 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964)).
59. Id. at 787-88.
60. See generally Fatouros, International Law and the Third World, 50 VA. L. RZv.
738, 807-11 (1964).
61. This view is found in the Harvard Draft Convention on the International responsi-
bility of States For Injuries to Aliens, reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States
For Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553 (1961). This
view is also found in the RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 187.
62. This position can be analogized to the Calvo doctrine, which proposed equal treat-
[Vol. 14:2
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scribing to the third view maintain that, at least with respect to
non-discriminatory expropriations, the alien property owner must
satisfy himself with "partial" compensation which would take into
account the resources and paying capacity of the paying state."
Actions taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on the subject of compensation for expropriation of foreign-owned
property further illustrate the lack of a coherent international
standard. 4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803
(XVII) includes a clause in paragraph 4 stating that the "owner [of
expropriated property] shall be paid appropriate compensation
. . . in accordance with international law."6 Eleven years after
Resolution 1803 was adopted, a completely different approach was
taken at the XXVIII Session of the General Assembly. Through
the adoption of Resolution 3171,16 the General Assembly deleted
all references to international law in the determination of appro-
priate compensation. Under Resolution 3171, only local law gov-
erns the determination of compensation, if any, and the method of
payment. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank
reached the Second Circuit on appeal from the District Court for
the Southern District of New York with the foregoing interpreta-
tions given the act of state doctrine and the "proper" standard of
compensation to be given to aliens who undergo expropriation of
their property.
III. THE CHASE OPINION
The court in Chase, in adjudicating the justiciability of
Chase's counterclaims, amalgamated the views of the majority and
concurring opinions in First National, concluding that:
[Wlhere (1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bernstein let-
ter advising the courts that it believes [the] act of state doctrine
need not be applied, (2) there is no showing that an adjudication
of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and (3)
ment under which aliens could not claim any greater measure of protection than nationals.
See C. CALvo, 6 LE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 231 (5th ed. 1885). See generally Garcia-Amador,
The Proposed New Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationaliza-
tion and Compensation, 12 LAw. AM. 1, 2-5 (1980).
63. See Rafat, Compensation For Expropriated Property in Recent International Law,
14 VIL. L. REv. 199, 201-08 (1969).
64. The court in Chase analyzed the actions taken by the United Nations General As-
sembly. 658 F.2d at 889-91.
65. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
66. U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171 (XXVIII) (1974).
1982]
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the claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of
counterclaim and does not exceed the value of the sovereign's
claim, adjudication of the counterclaim for expropriation of the
defendant's property is not barred by the act of state iloctrine.7
The court went on to hold that Chase's counterclaim was justi-
ciable since all three conditions had been met. 8 Since Chase and
First National were factually similar,0 9 the Chase court apparently
felt secure in applying the precepts set forth by the majority and
concurring opinions in First National, despite the disparate views
of the Justices in that case.7 0 The three conditions enunciated in
Chase that must be met to preclude application of the act of state
doctrine emanate directly from the views expressed by Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and Douglas in First National. The first condi-
tion has its source in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in First
National. The second condition arises from the view taken by Jus-
tice Powell while the third condition is that formulated by Justice
Douglas.
Each of the three conditions set forth in Chase must be met
individually to preclude application of the act of state doctrine.
This is evidenced by other recent decisions of the Second Circuit.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1 a
suit decided by the Second Circuit on the same day that Banco
Nacional was decided, suit was brought against Banco Nacional by
the assignee of a national bank to recover unreimbursed payments
made by its assigner on letters of credit issued by its Cuban
branches prior to expropriation by the Cuban government. The
court held that the act of state doctrine applies where an American
bank initiates the claim and seeks affirmative relief 72 Because the
first condition was not satisfied, the act of state doctrine was ap-
plied. Similarly, in another case7" decided on the same day as
67. 658 F.2d at 884.
68. Id.
69. Both cases involved counterclaims by American banks against Banco Nacional for
damages as a result of the Cuban expropriation of their assets.
70. The Bernstein exception was adopted by Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and White. It
was expressly rejected by the other six Justices. Justice Douglas' view that Republic of
China controlled was not adopted by any other member of the Court, although two Justices
saw that situation as analogous. Justice Powell's view that the act of state doctrine should
be applied only when failure to apply it would interfere with foreign relations was his view
alone.
71. 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 902.
73. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d
[Vol. 14:2
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Banco Nacional, involving a suit by Banco Nacional against three
United States trust companies to recover funds allegedly owed by
the defendants, the Second Circuit held that the defendant's coun-
terclaims were not justiciable since the record did not contain a
Bernstein letter stating the views of the State Department. The
failure to satisfy the first condition expressed in Chase thus trig-
gered the application of the act of state defense.74
The three conditions necessary to preclude application of the
act of state doctrine were met in Chase. Therefore, Chase was al-
lowed to assert its branch counterclaim. The first condition was
satisfied since there were three State Department communications
pertinent to the Executive Branch's views.75 The court went on to
hold, in a rather perfunctory manner, that the second"6 and third77
conditions were also satisfied.
In holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply to pre-
clude Chase's counterclaim, the court necessarily had to, and in-
deed did, find that the issue of damages was justiciable.7 8 The
court concluded that the issue as to the justiciability of those dam-
ages was foreclosed by the decision in First National.79 Conse-
quently, any argument to the effect that there is no appropriate
standard for compensation as a result of foreign expropriation is
necessarily foreclosed. Such a finding is mandated whenever the
third condition expressed in Chase is imposed, since "the very con-
clusion that justiciability turn[s] on the amount of the counter-
claim necessarily contemplate[s] that valuation issues [arel to be
decided." 80
In determining Chase's damages for the expropriation of its
branches, the court attempted to determine the "proper" standard
Cir. 1981). This was a consolidation of three cases.
74. Id. at 921.
75. 658 F.2d at 884. The first is the letter dated November 17, 1970, written during the
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba litigation. See supra text at 336. A
second letter was written by the State Department to Chase's counsel stating that the De-
partment continued to hold the view expressed in the November 17, 1970, letter with re-
spect to "this or like cases." The third communication was a June 11, 1980, confirmation by
the Department that it still held the prior views as expressed in the two previous letters.
The Department also stated that the Chase opinion appeared to be a case like First
National.
76. Id. at 884-85.
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of compensation.81 The court also recognized that it had to apply
principles of international law." Despite the court's awareness of
the lack of an explicit international standard of expropriation,
83 it
nevertheless summarily concluded that the "instant case ...
presents fewer difficulties than some we might envision insofar as
the selection of a standard of compensation is concerned." 4
The court stated that there were four choices from which it
could choose, namely, the three standards prevalent in current in-
ternational law and a fourth standard of "appropriate" compensa-
tion." The court, in concluding that "in the circumstances of the
present case, there is probably no difference between the last two
[appropriate compensation and full compensation], '"8 6 seems to
have been overzealous in its attempt to define "appropriate com-
pensation." The court's sole support for its conclusion is the posi-
tion adopted by the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States. 7 Notwithstanding the definition
given in the Restatement, the court appears to have given little
consideration to the international community's definition of "ade-
quate compensation," especially in light of the United Nations res-
olutions subsequent to Resolution 1803. The court's position is fur-
ther weakened by the fact that the United States ambassador,
prior to the adoption of Resolution 1803, did not specify that "ade-
quate" meant "full" compensation.8 8
The court went on to reject the view that no compensation
81. The court of appeals had previously determined that Chase could not assert its
counterclaim as trustee for the owners of the railroad equipment since the "opposing" party
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) had not met. The requirement was not met because
Banco Nacional did not sue Chase in its capacity as trustee or assert any claims against the
trust. Id. at 893-94.
82. 658 F.2d at 887-88.
83. Id. at 891.
84. The court stated that "the overview of the actions of [the] members of the General
Assembly presents at best, a confusing picture as to what the consensus may be as to the
responsibilities of an expropriating state to pay "appropriate compensation,' and just what
that term may mean." Id. at 891.
85. Id.
86. The "full compensation" standard is also known as the "Hull" doctrine. The term
originates from a dispute between the United States and Mexico over Mexican agrarian and
oil expropriations in 1938. United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in a note dated
April 30, 1940, to the Mexican Foreign Minister, stated the point of view of the United
States government in these terms: "[T]he right to expropriate property is coupled with and
conditional on the obligation to make adequate, effective, and prompt compensation" (em-
phasis added).
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §§ 187-88.
88. 658 F.2d at 889.
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must be paid, stating that "we regard so much of the General As-
sembly resolutions as purport to allow expropriating states to de-
termine the existence and scope of their duties to compensate
aliens as not correctly reflecting internatonal law."89 The court, in
its cursory examination, appears to have ignored the overwhelming
support the United Nations resolutions received.90 The court also
disposed of the view that an expropriating state need never pay
more than partial compensation. The sole support for that conclu-
sion is the fallacious reasoning underlying Banco Nacional's argu-
ment. Banco Nacional had argued that "because a negotiated set-
tlement will not result in full payment, an expropriation victim has
no right to more than partial compensation."' 1 Notwithstanding
the weaknesses in Banco Nacional's argument, the court appar-
ently failed to take into account other arguments supporting the
"partial compensation" standard.92
The court finally concluded that the "full compensation" stan-
dard is the proper standard to be used, at least in the instant
case.' In effect, the court applied the traditional compensation
standard ("full compensation") and concluded that, at least on the
facts of the instant case, that standard is the same as the interna-
tional standard of "appropriate compensation."
Although the Second Circuit applied the "full compensation"
standard, it denied the amount awarded Chase by the district
court for going concern value,'94 thus reducing the amount Chase
could setoff against Banco Nacional's claim. The Second Circuit
and the district court thus disagreed as to what constitutes "full
compensation." The Second Circuit viewed the district court's
award to Chase for going concern value as improper, since there
was "no warrant for believing that, at a time when aliens were flee-
ing Cuba and many foreign businesses were being abandoned or
nationalized, a potential buyer with his eyes open would have paid
Chase a premium in anticipation of its future Cuban earnings."as
89. Id. at 891.
90. The vote on Resolution 3171 was 109 in favor, one against, and seventeen ab-
staining (including the United States).
91. 658 F.2d at 892.
92. Id. at 891.
93. Id. at 892.
94. Id. at 894. The court stated that the "term "going concern value' generally refers to
the proposition that the prospective buyer of a business will be willing to pay a premium
over the book value of the assets in the expectation that the earnings of the business will
continue and that the new owner will receive that stream of earnings." Id. at 893.
95. Id.
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Other than reducing the amount of setoff allowed Chase for the
expropriation of its Cuban branches, the Second Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court in all other respects."6
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit had to face the compensation issue as a
result of the holding in First National. According to Sabbatino,
acts of expropriation were justiciable only if the international law
was unambiguous. If the international law was only "customary,"
then counterclaims based upon a foreign nation's expropriation
were thought to be "political," and thus, nonjusticiable. Under the
holding in First National, however, counterclaims arising from for-
eign acts of state may be justiciable even in the absence of a dis-
positive international law of expropriation. Such a result is man-
dated, since, under the three conditions imposed by First
National, and adopted by the court in the instant case, an act of
foreign expropriation can fall outside the ambit of the act of state
doctrine, even if the relevant law is ambiguous. Thus, the court in
the instant case had to face the compensation issue and formulate
a standard deemed to be compatible with the "international stan-
dard," of compensation, if indeed, one exists.
Perhaps the court was bolstered in its conclusions as a result
of its original holding in Sabbatino, when it concluded that the
expropriation in that case was illegal under international law be-
cause it not only failed to provide adequate compensation, but be-
cause it also involved a retaliatory purpose and discrimination
against United States nationals.9 7 The Second Circuit in.Sabbatino
contrasted the Cuban expropriation with one involving a "failure
to pay adequate compensation . . . when the expropriation is part
of a scheme of general social improvement."98 The latter type of
expropriation was said to have stronger support in the interna-
tional community.
It is likely that the Second Circuit viewed the expropriation of
Chase's assets with as much scorn as it did the expropriation in
Sabbatino. For that reason, it presumably felt justified in using the
96. Id.
97. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
98. Id. at 866. Its decision rested on the argument that the act of state doctrine applied
to the case, and consequently, barred the United States courts from examining the validity
of the Cuban expropriation under international law.
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"full compensation" standard. 9 In both cases, the Second Circuit
avoided the question of compensation in the context of impersonal
and general expropriations, presumably because the international
law with regard to such types of expropriation was not as clear cut
as it was with "wrongful," i.e. retaliatory and discriminatory expro-
priations. The Second Circuit was thus able to impose the "full
compensation" standard in Chase without making any determina-
tion as to whether that standard is to be applied in cases involving
expropriations that are not "retaliatory" and "discriminatory."
Perhaps the Chase decision was shaped more by the interna-
tional climate than by any other factor.100 The decision illustrates
that courts in the future that decide cases involving foreign expro-
priations will have at least one, and possibly two, issues to resolve.
First, they will have to decide whether the act of state doctrine
should be applied, and second, if it is found that the doctrine
should apply, the proper amount of compensation to award to the
party whose property was expropriated.
KYLE A. SILVERMAN
99. In both cases, the expropriation of assets owned by United States banks resulted as
an immediate response to the United States' enactment of a statute repealing the Cuban
sugar quota. As a result, the expropriations were seen as retaliatory acts. They were discrim-
inatory in that Canadian-owned banks were not expropriated until a later date.
100. Sabbatino occurred during a period of intense foreign crisis. In Sabbatino, the
State Department urged the application of the act of state doctrine, while in subsequent
cases, it urged the preclusion of the doctrine, presumably because of the lack of a foreign
crisis.
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